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ENTERING THE MAINSTREAM: MAKING
CHILDREN MATTER IN IMMIGRATION LAW
David B. Thronson*
ABSTRACT
Myths that parents are afforded easy and unwarranted pathways to U.S.
citizenship through their U.S. citizen children and that children receive pri-
vileged treatment in U.S. immigration law stubbornly persist in public dis-
cussion surrounding possible immigration reform. Testing these myths,
this essay examines immigration law's treatment of children in three con-
texts: (1) as lawfully immigrating dependents of adults; (2) as immigrants
on their own or outside the structures of immigration law; and (3) as indi-
viduals empowered to generate immigration rights in others. In each of
these contexts, analysis reveals that the failure of immigration law to ad-
vance, or in most instances even consider, the interests of children places it
far from mainstream values and legal conceptions regarding children. In
particular, immigration law fails to fully recognize children as individuals
with independent rights and interests, attaches punishing and lasting legal
consequences to children for choices of adults in their lives or for choices
that children make prior to reaching the age of discretion, and effectively
and pervasively precludes children from generating immigration rights in
their parents or others.
At the least, this deeper understanding of the nature of immigration
law's marginalization of children serves as a counterweight to calls for
reform based on false characterizations of current law. Ironically, myths
about the treatment of children in immigration law serve as an effective
template for simple, yet fundamental reforms that would bring U.S. immi-
gration law closer to mainstream values and approaches regarding children.
The essay suggests three simple, yet fundamental reforms that would not
only bring the law closer to mainstream values, but also closer to the place
where many seem to think it is already. Any reform agenda that fails to
address the role of children in immigration law will not prevent accepted
societal and demographic pressures from replicating the current situation in
. Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. I would like to thank Vero-
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which millions find themselves unable to reconcile their family relation-
ships and responsibilities with the dictates of immigration law. Children
matter, and it is time they mattered in U.S. immigration law.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A b stract ...................................................................................................... 393
Introduction ............................................................................................... 394
I. Children in Im m igration Law .............................................................. 396
A. Children as Dependents and Derivatives ................................. 396
B. Children as Im m igrants ........................................................... 399
C. Children as Generators of Immigration Rights in Others ........ 402
II. Entering the M ainstream .................................................................... 407
A. Expanding Notions of Family .................................................. 407
B. Removing Punishment for the Acts of Parents ........................ 409
C. Children as Generators of Immigration Rights ........................ 410
C onclusion ................................................................................................. 4 12
INTRODUCTION
Listening to the national discussion on immigration, it would be easy to
conclude that children hold a privileged position in U.S. immigration and
nationality laws. Children, we are warned, enable their parents to avoid
deportation and obtain lawful immigration status in the country. Indeed, it
is common to hear "frustration that pregnant women could cross the border
from Mexico illegally, then rely on their American citizen newborns to put
them immediately on a path to citizenship."' And, as some voices unease
about children "anchoring" their parents to the United States, other voices
express contrary concerns about parents who are not grounded in the Unit-
ed States and "drop and leave," raising their U.S. citizen children outside
the United States where they may develop allegiances counter to U.S. in-
terests.2 Certainly such arguments regarding the citizenship and immigra-
1. Julia Preston, Citizenship From Birth is Challenged on the Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/07/us/politics/O7fourteenth.html?_rl &ref='
fourteenthamendment. "You know the anchor baby. You know what that is. It's when a
child is born here, becomes a citizen and they help the illegal parents become citizens, right?
... Oh, that baby is a child. It's an anchor. It's an anchor to stay here." Truth-O-Meter,
POLITIFACT (June 19, 2009), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2009/un/
19/glenn-beck/glenn-beck-claims-us-only-country-automatic-citize/ (quoting Glenn Beck,
Fox News, June 10, 2009).
2. See, e.g., Andy Barr, Grahman Eyes "Birthright Citizenship," POLITICO (July 29,
2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/40395.html. At its extreme, the concern
is that terrorists would use "young women, who became pregnant, would get them into the
United States to have a baby... And then they would turn back where they could be raised
and coddled as future terrorists. And then one day, 20, 30 years down the road, they can be
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tion rights of children have long been part of a loud political discourse and
predictably serve as an effective wedge issue in the shifting winds of elec-
toral politics.3 Yet even setting aside the most extreme distortions, the dis-
cussion of children and immigration is characterized by persistent myths
about the treatment of children and their parents in U.S. law. Whatever po-
sition is taken on policy issues, it is common to characterize the rights and
role of children in matters of nationality and immigration as expansive. As
the mainstream calls for examination of children's citizenship and immi-
gration rights, the actual treatment of children in U.S. immigration law
warrants deeper exploration.
This analysis reveals that the actual treatment of children under U.S.
immigration law strays far from mainstream conceptions regarding child-
ren. Indeed, perhaps one reason for the persistence of myths related to
children and immigration is that reality is so dissonant with accepted no-
tions and values about the treatment of children in law. In many contexts,
immigration law is notable for its exceptionalism.4 Yet revealing the extent
to which U.S. immigration law diverges from the mainstream in its ap-
proach to children provides striking evidence of the extreme level at which
immigration law fails to synchronize with broadly held views of law and
society. At least a deeper understanding of the nature of immigration law's
marginalization of children serves as a counterweight to calls for reform
based on false characterizations of current law. More importantly, the ex-
amination of the treatment of children in immigration law serves not only
as a critique of current law, but also as a template for simple, yet funda-
mental reforms that would bring U.S. immigration law closer to main-
stream values and approaches regarding children.
sent in to help destroy our way of life." Jen Phillips, Sexism in the Immigration, Birthright
Debates, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 4, 2010), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/08/birthright-
citizenship-sexism-drop-babies (quoting Rep. Gohmert) (alteration in original).
3. See Emi Kolawole, A Blast From Harry Reid's Past on Birthright Citizenship,
WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/08/reids-immig
ration-problem.html (noting that in contrast to his current position on the issue, "Reid spon-
sored a bill in 1993 that would have denied citizenship to children born in the United States
if their mothers were not citizens at the time of delivery").
4. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("This Court has repeatedly emphasized
that 'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of the Congress more complete
than it is over' the admission of aliens." (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranhan, 214
U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its
broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (upholding racially based deportation law directed at Chinese la-
borers).
5. Though beyond the scope of this essay, it is worth noting that this exercise has re-
levance internationally as well as domestically. See Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across Bor-
ders: The Hague Children s Conventions and the Case for International Family Law in the
2010]
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I. CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION LAW
The parameters of immigration law are easily seen to encompass deci-
sions about who may enter and remain in the United States. In thinking
about these decisions, the focus generally and understandably turns to the
immigrants themselves. This analysis will do the same, starting with an
examination of children lawfully immigrating as dependents of adults, then
turning to children immigrating on their own or outside the structures of
immigration law. In both situations, examination reveals that U.S. immi-
gration law fails to fully recognize children as individuals with independent
rights and interests.
Less obvious is that immigration law encompasses the empowerment of
individuals to generate immigration rights in others. Much of U.S. immi-
gration law details which individuals and entities are empowered to gener-
ate immigration rights in others through their relationships and actions. It
is in this regard that children are most openly marginalized and devalued
by U.S. immigration law.
A. Children as Dependents and Derivatives
Descriptions of U.S immigration law often note its purported goal of
keeping families intact, and in a limited respect, such statements are entire-
ly accurate.6 Immigration law includes an elaborate system of family-
sponsored immigration and provisions for derivative immigration of the
family members of certain immigrants who qualify under family-
sponsored, employment-based, or diversity visa lottery provisions.7 The
application of these provisions in these three primary avenues to achieve
lawful immigration status in the United States results in the issuance of
immigration visas to many children, leaving a general impression that im-
migration law is favorably oriented towards children.
8
United States, 62 FLA. L. REV. 47, 48 (2009) ("As the scale and frequency of global move-
ment has increased, family and children's issues have also taken on a new relevance in for-
eign relations.").
6. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Immigration Reform and Control of the Undocumented
Family, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 295, 296-97 (1988).
7. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. §
1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (excluding "immediate relatives" of U.S citizens from direct nu-
merical limitations on immigrant visas); id. § 1151(c) (setting levels of family-sponsored
immigrants); id. § 1153(a) (creating preference categories for family-sponsored immi-
grants); id. § 1153(d) (permitting some family members to accompany or follow to join
family members with immigrant visas).
8. "The legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly indicates that
the Congress intended to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with
the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united." H.R. REP.
No. 1199, at 7 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2016, 2020.
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For example, in fiscal year 2009 children as beneficiaries of petitions by
parents or as derivatives of parents granted immigration visas constituted
about 26.6% of all family-sponsored immigration. 9 Similarly, 24.7% of
employment-based visas and 26.2% of diversity visas were issued to child-
ren as derivatives. 10 Children are a significant portion of the flow of immi-
grants into the United States pursuant to immigration laws, and their nu-
merical prominence could easily be interpreted as an indication that
children's interests are an important focus in immigration law. Delving
deeper than the numbers, however, reveals that immigration law is struc-
tured to advance the interests of adults, not children.
As an initial matter, not all children are "children" for immigration pur-
poses. Under immigration law, a child is recognized as a "child" only if
she meets the criteria of a "particularly exhaustive" statutory definition.1
With clear intent not to include all children, a "child" is defined as one who
meets other qualifying conditions, such as being born in wedlock or having
a father who has taken specified steps to "legitimate[]" his child. 12 By bas-
ing the qualifications of who becomes a "child" firmly on the actions and
decisions of parents, this definition empowers parents as "rights holders who
may take action to recognize a 'child' for immigration purposes. Children, in
contrast, are by definition passive objects subject to parental control."'13
Moreover, relationships outside the formal confines of the statutory de-
finition of child, even those that approximate or functionally match the sta-
tutory categories, do not create a parent-child relationship for immigration
purposes. 14 Even when a woman's "relationship with her nieces closely
resembles a parent-child relationship, [the courts] are constrained to hold
that Congress, through the plain language of the statute, precluded this
9. Of the 747,413 immigrants admitted under immediate relative and family preference
categories, 198,751 were children. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR
2009, available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/LPR09.shtm (follow "Ta-
ble 7" hyperlink).
10. Of 144,034 employment-visas, 35,570 were issued to derivative children. Child de-
rivatives were 11,479 of 47,879 admissions under the diversity lottery. Id.
11. INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986) (per curiam); see also Immigration and Nationali-
ty Act § 101(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(1) (2006).
12. See 8 U.S.C. § l101(b)(1).
13. David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's
Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 992 (2002).
14. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the Ruritanian
Lawmaker, 43 AM. J. CoMP. L. 511, 529 (1995) (noting that the Immigration and Nationality
Act "enumerates recognized family relationships, and the courts have consistently rejected
attempts to use surrogate family relationships to meet statutory requirements").
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functional approach to defining the word 'child."'' 5 Although courts have
noted that with regard to "the technical definition of 'child' contained with-
in this statute ... it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at
a different point ... these are policy questions entrusted exclusively to the
political branches of our Government."' 6 This formalistic approach fails to
account for choices outside the child's control about who can and will pro-
vide care for her, and contrasts with the treatment of children in other areas
of law. "To be sure, the [Immigration and Nationality Act's] definition of
'child' may be far out of step with the times, and may have particularly de-
leterious effects on aliens whose culture's definition of 'family' is legiti-
mately broader than the traditional definition of those related by blood or
adoption."' 17
Even when adults have acted in such a way that children may be recog-
nized as children under immigration law, the result is not that children are
empowered under immigration law, but rather that immigration law allows
parents to decide if their children may accompany them in the exercise of
the parents' rights. 8 An "unfortunately common problem with the family-
based immigration regime . . .[is that] [d]erivative beneficiaries are just
that--derivative-meaning that they have few rights of their own and in-
stead depend on the competence and cooperation of the principal immi-
grant." 19 Not all parents are cooperative, and others are not able to compe-
tently avoid actions or decisions that preclude their attainment of lawful
immigration status. By limiting access to the major avenues for acquiring
permanent resident status for children to their status as dependents, immi-
gration law subordinates children to their parents' rights and abilities.
Family-sponsored immigration provides no benefits to children because
15. Hector, 479 U.S. at 90-91 (reversing a decision that nieces aged ten and eleven in
the care of their aunt for three years were the "functional equivalent" of children under the
Immigration and Nationality Act); see also Moreno-Morante v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1172,
1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the argument that grandchildren were "de facto" children);
Dorado v. Gonzalez, 202 F. App'x 898, 899 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the unadopted son
of the applicant's long time girlfriend was not a "child" under the Act).
16. Hector, 479 U.S. at 89 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977)).
17. Dorado, 202 F. App'x at 902. For an insightful discussion of the implications of
this formalistic approach, see Marcia Zug, Deporting Grandma: Why Grandparent Deporta-
tion May Be the Next Big Immigration Crisis and How to Solve it, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
193 (2009).
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (allowing petitions for children by U.S. citi-
zen parents); id § 1153(a)(2) (allowing petitions for children by permanent residence par-
ents).
19. Fomalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 527-28 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing abusive fa-
ther's failure to include his seventeen-year-old son in an immigration petition for other
family members which led to the determination to deport him alone back to Poland while
leaving his mother and siblings in the United States).
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they are children. The "right" parent who advances successfully through
the maze of immigration law is rewarded, and the child may benefit. But
other than as a dependent of the "right" parent, the major paths to acquiring
lawful immigration provide no special recognition or rights to children as
individuals.
20
By focusing on the adults in children's lives rather than children them-
selves, U.S. immigration law fails to recognize children as individuals. By
arbitrarily limiting the pool of adults in children's lives who matter for pur-
poses of immigration law, the law further devalues the perspective of the
child, who might be cared for by persons other than those qualifying as
parents under immigration law. This rejection of the perspectives and
realities of children reinforces the conception of children as dependents, not
as individuals. This has negative consequences for the child lacking the
"right" parent, and the pervasive influence of this limiting conception of
children further impedes children who immigrate on their own or outside
legal pathways.
B. Children as Immigrants
Children arriving as dependents of lawfully immigrating parents are not
the only child immigrants to the United States. Unaccompanied children
arrive in the United States by the thousands each year.2 1 Many more child-
ren arrive with their parents or other adults, yet outside the frameworks of
lawful immigration. 22  In 2008, approximately 1.5 million unauthorized
children lived in the United States with their parents, 23 and there has been
"little change in number of unauthorized children since 2003",24 because
20. "To the extent that the framework for family-sponsored and derivative immigration
tends to achieve family integrity, it does so by ceding control over a child's status to parents
and by denying opportunities for children to achieve legal status as children without their
parents." David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Rela-
tionship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1182 (2006).
21. Approximately 80,000 unaccompanied children are apprehended annually. See
CHAD C. HADDAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RI 33896, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN:
POLICIES AND ISSUES 1 (2009). Many are turned back, while others are detained. See id. at
18 (noting that in fiscal year 2007, the Department of Homeland Security detained 8227 un-
accompanied children).
22. In fact, children in immigrant families are significantly more likely to live with two
parents than are children in native families. DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, GENERATIONAL PAT-
TERNS IN THE U.S.: AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY AND OTHER SOURCES 15 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Education/paradox/documents/Hernandez.pdf.
23. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 6-7 (Pew Hisp. Ctr. 2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/
reports/107.pdf.
24. Id. at 4. The population of undocumented children was estimated at 1.8 million in
2005. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
2010]
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even as children become adults and cease to be counted as children, new
arrivals augment the population of children with lawful immigration status.
As a result of these flows of child immigrants outside the frameworks of
immigration law, about thirteen percent of unauthorized immigrants living
in the United States are children. 25
As described in the section above, the most prominent pathway of fami-
ly-sponsored immigration provides no benefit to children based on being
children. In seeking other forms of immigration relief, children are not ex-
pressly precluded but are held to the same substantive criteria as adults.
For example, while children are theoretically eligible for employment-
based immigration they are unlikely to meet the immigration law require-
ments related to education and experience, let alone restrictions on the em-
ployment of child labor.26
Like adults, children can independently seek humanitarian forms of im-
migration relief, such as asylum and protection from removal under the
Convention Against Torture, 27 but the "normative and legal substantive
framework for unaccompanied children in removal proceedings is based
upon an adult framework and does not incorporate a child-oriented frame-
work.''28 Moreover, the dominant conception in immigration law of child-
ren as dependents can inhibit the recognition of individual rights and pers-
pectives of children, especially when children are not alone.29 In fact, the
one form of immigration relief solely available to children, special immi-
grant juvenile status, is available only to children declared dependent by a
POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY 7 (Pew Hisp. Ctr. 2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61 .pdf.
25. PASSEL, supra note 24, at 5.
26. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2006).
27. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1347 n.8 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming
that any person, regardless of age, may apply for asylum); Christopher Nugent, Whose
Children Are These? Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and Empowerment of Unaccom-
paniedAlien Children, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219 (2006).
28. M. Aryah Somers et al., Constructions of Childhood and Unaccompanied Children
in the Immigration System in the United States, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 311, 372
(2010).
29. See Don v. Gonzalez, 476 F.3d 738, 739 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Don is the principal or
lead petitioner; his wife's and child's petitions are derivative of his petition. Therefore, their
asylum claims succeed or fail with Don's claims."). I have argued elsewhere regarding the
negative impact that the dominant paradigm of immigration law has on the plight of unac-
companied minors. See Thronson, supra note 13, at 992-94; see also Bridgette A. Carr, In-
corporating a "Best Interests of the Child" Approach Into Immigration Law and Procedure,
12 YALE HuM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 120, 122-23 (2009) ("In contrast with unaccompanied or
separated children, accompanied children face a bigger risk of being invisible in the United
States immigration system and face the additional risk of having conflicting interests with
their parents.").
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juvenile court, and emphasizes not children's agency, but their dependen-
cy. 3
0
Recent legislative reforms, drawing heavily from numerous and exhaus-
tive scholarly critiques of precedent and prior legal practice, 31 have im-
proved procedures for unaccompanied minors in removal proceedings and
detention policies for children. 32  Despite these reforms, for unaccompa-
nied minors "the removal system has structurally remained largely intact
and... [w]ith the advent of new actors and roles in the system, the depen-
dency and developmental constructions of childhood have found greater
expression in the structure of the removal system." 33
Just as the substantive eligibility criteria for immigration relief apply to
children as they do adults, grounds of inadmissibility that can baffle even
qualified immigrants apply to children just as they do adults.34  Further-
more, there are penalties and barriers that immigration laws impose on per-
sons who enter the United States without inspection and fail to maintain
lawful status, which apply to children as well as adults.35
This is true regardless of whether the child exercised independent judg-
ment and volition in deciding to enter the United States, or whether the
child was carried across the border as a baby. For example, a child who
was carried into the United States without inspection as an infant is forever
barred from an important immigration law procedure known as adjustment
of status, which forecloses that individual from establishing eligibility for
30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2006); Thronson, supra note 29.
31. See, e.g., Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: Unaccom-
panied Child Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 84, 93
(1999); Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting Undocumented Immigrant Children
From Their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How to Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997 Amend-
ments to the SIJ Law, 15 B.U. Pun. INT. L.J. 237 (2006); Nugent, supra note 27; Katherine
Porter, Comment, In the Best Interests of the INS: An Analysis of the 1997 Amendment to the Spe-
cial Immigrant Juvenile Law, 27 J. LEGIs. 441 (2001).
32. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 462(g)(2)(A)-(C),
116 Stat. 2153 (transferring custody, care, and placement of "unaccompanied alien children"
from the disbanded Immigration and Naturalization Service to the Office of Refugee Reset-
tlement); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). For a thorough discussion of procedural and
detention policy evolution, see Somers et al., supra note 28.
33. Somers et al., supra note 28, at 372 (alteration in original).
34. No distinction is made between children and adults in grounds of inadmissibility that
apply generally to all immigrants. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2006) (establishing
inadmissibility ground for all persons present without permission or parole regardless of
age); id § 11 82(a)(7)(A) (establishing documents-related inadmissibility grounds regardless
of age).
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (limiting adjustment of status to persons "inspected and ad-
mitted or paroled into the United States"); id. § 1255(c)(7) (barring adjustment of status of
persons "not in a lawful immigration status").
2010]
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lawful immigration through other avenues, such as marriage or employ-
ment.36 Here, as noted in the above section, the child is not held accounta-
ble for individual actions, but is saddled with consequences of decisions of-
ten made or influenced by parents and other adults. 37 Rather than special
treatment based on childhood, children are punished for the choices of
adults in their lives or for choices made prior to reaching the age of discre-
tion.
C. Children as Generators of Immigration Rights in Others
With the passage of state and local laws impacting immigrants, the ten-
sion between state and federal power to regulate immigration is on constant
display. But, on a practical level, most choices about who acquires lawful
immigration status are neither federal nor state, but rather profoundly per-
sonal. It is obvious that immigration law addresses the rights of persons
seeking to immigrate or remain in the United States, but it is less remarked
upon that immigration law deals directly with determining when U.S. citi-
zens, legal permanent residents, and businesses may create immigration
rights in others. A few forms of immigration relief, such as asylum, are
available to qualifying applicants upon their own request based on their
personal experiences. 38  In contrast, U.S. immigration law is structured
mainly to sift through requests from U.S. citizens, permanent residents, and
businesses who seek the right to be joined to individual relatives or pros-
pective employees they have selected for an immigration benefit, not to
consider requests from intending immigrants themselves.
Indeed, this decentralization of immigration decisions is a key characte-
ristic of U.S. immigration law and it empowers individuals, not govern-
ments, to determine who will be eligible to immigrate to the United
States.39 Subsequent to eligibility, immigration law creates limitations
based on screening for inadmissibility criteria, such as the exclusions of in-
dividuals with criminal histories.40 Nevertheless, underlying eligibility for
immigration as a family member or employee is a matter of individuals'
choices and discretion, not federal, state, or local governments. Ultimately,
the intending immigrant's right to immigrate turns less on their own talents
36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(7).
37. Jacqueline Bhabha, "Not a Sack of Potatoes": Moving and Removing Children
Across Borders, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 198-99 (2006).
38. See 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A).
39. This system contrasts with those of other countries utilizing "point systems," where
intending immigrants qualify based on the accumulation of points for various personal
achievements and characteristics.
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (general grounds for inadmissibility); id. § 1 182(a)(2) (inadmis-
sibility related to criminal activity).
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and experiences than in the law's empowerment of U.S. citizens, perma-
nent residents, and businesses to choose potential immigrants. In this re-
gard, the ability to generate immigration rights in others diverges sharply
between children and adults.
Even when a qualifying family relationship is satisfactorily established under
U.S. immigration law, children are not afforded the same rights as adults to ex-
ercise agency and extend the possibility of immigration status to other family
members. Under the immigration law's family-sponsored immigration provi-
sions, legal permanent residents and U.S. citizens may petition for immigrant
visas for select relatives. 41 The "petitioner" is always the person having legal
immigration status and the "beneficiary" is the person the petitioner wishes to
immigrate.42 Through this framework, petitioners with lawful immigration sta-
tus control the flow of immigration status from themselves to others of their
choosing. Immigration law places the decision whether to petition for a qualify-
ing relative exclusively with the petitioner.
Immigration law prioritizes petitions of U.S. citizens above those of legal
permanent residents, and prioritizes some family relationships above others.43
Among the most favored petitions are those by U.S. citizens for their unmarried
minor children, and such petitions are not subject to numerical limits.44 Peti-
tions also may be based on the relationship between a legal permanent resident
parent and a child, though these types of petitions face annual numerical limita-
tions which result in backlogs. 45
Under this framework, the parent-child relationship is favored, but only
if the parent holds legal immigration status. As discussed in Part I.A, par-
ents who have or are successful in acquiring status as U.S. citizens or legal
permanent residents may extend that status to their dependent children. In
stark contrast, the framework of family-sponsored immigration does not
permit children to petition for their parents. Even though the parent-child
relationship is among those most favored by immigration law, it works in
41. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)
(2006); Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1154.
43. See generally Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Fami-
ly and Marriage?: Immigration Law's Conflicted Answer, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 273 (2003);
Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L. REV. 943, 955-60 (2001); Motomura,
supra note 14, at 528; Victor C. Romero, Asians, Gay Marriage, and Immigration: Family
Unification at a Crossroads, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 337 (2005).
44. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2006). Bureaucratic
processing delays mean that the immediate availability of immigration visas should never be con-
fused with the ability to immigrate immediately.
45. The Department of State published a monthly Visa Bulletin which tracks the back-
logs and processing of immigrant visa petitions. See Visa Bulletin, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
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only one direction, with parents petitioning for children, but not vice versa.
In fact, U.S. citizens may petition for their parents only when the petitioner
is considered an adult at age twenty-one.46
The ability of a parent to generate immigration status for a child in the
absence of the ability of children to do so for their parents reveals an
asymmetry that is pervasive in immigration law.47 Child asylees and refu-
gees may not extend derivative status to their parents, yet adult asylees and ref-
ugees may generate derivative status for their spouses and children.48 Similarly,
a child granted protection from removal pursuant to the Convention Against
Torture may not extend eligibility to a parent.49 A child who obtains legal
immigration status through a family petition from one parent or a steppa-
rent may not include the other parent as a derivative.5" In fact, children
who are parents themselves may not even extend immigration status ac-
quired through a petition from a parent to their own children because deriv-
ative status extends to only one generation.5
This asymmetry extends beyond the family-sponsored immigration
framework into other areas where family relationships are granted signific-
ance by immigration law. In instances where a person is eligible for an
immigration visa, grounds for inadmissibility still may preclude a benefi-
ciary from being able to immigrate to the United States.52 Since 1996, for
example, U.S. immigration law has included provisions barring for three
years the reentry of people who leave the United States after remaining
here unlawfully for more than 180 days. 53 A person who remains in the
United States unlawfully for a year or more, then leaves, is barred from
reentry for ten years. 54 The result is that a person who has been in the
country unlawfully for more than a year cannot initiate the consular process
without facing a ten year wait outside the country despite otherwise quali-
46. Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)
(2006).
47. See Jacqueline Bhabha, The "Mere Fortuity" of Birth? Are Children Citizens?, in 15
DIFFERENCES: J. FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 91, 95 (2004) (discussing the "striking asymme-
try in the family reunification rights of similarly placed adults and minor children").
48. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 207(c)(2), 208(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(2),
1158(b)(3) (2006).
49. See generally Lori A. Nessel, Forced to Choose: Torture, Family Reunification and Unit-
ed States Immigration Policy, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 897 (2005). See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)
(2010) (setting forth procedures and criteria for applications for relief pursuant to the Con-
vention Against Torture).
50. Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2006).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 1182.
53. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I).
54. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
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fying for an immigration visa. These provisions particularly impact per-
sons who entered the country without inspection, who are thus barred from
processing their immigration petition in the United States through a process
known as adjustment of status."
Recognizing the hardship that a bar to admission for three or ten years
can impose, immigration law does provide for a waiver of these grounds of
inadmissibility by establishing that inadmissibility would result in hardship
to family members. 56 Under the terms of the waiver provision, however,
only hardship faced by adult family members, i.e., spouses and parents, is
considered.57 Hardship that will result to children is statutorily irrelevant
and children's interests are excluded from the waiver process.
58
The absence of meaningful consideration of children and their interests
also is present when persons face removal from the United States. Persons
in removal proceedings may apply for cancellation of the removal if they
meet a number of criteria, including having been physically present in the
United States for ten years and being of good moral character. 59 They also
must establish that removal would cause "exceptional and extremely un-
usual hardship" to a legal permanent resident or U.S. citizen spouse, parent,
or child.60 While hardship to children is factored in to this form of immi-
gration relief, the standard is high and difficult to satisfy. To qualify, par-
ents must demonstrate hardship to children "substantially different from, or
beyond that which would normally be expected from the deportation of an
alien with close family members here."
61
In other words, the expected or normal hardship that the deportation of a
parent entails is deemed an acceptable result of the enforcement of immi-
gration laws and insufficient to warrant relief. Under this reasoning, sepa-
55. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(a)-(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)-(c) (2006).
Unsurprisingly, the impact of this provision is most felt by immigrants from countries
relatively close to the United States from which it is difficult to obtain visas permitting
lawful entry. For example, 84% of unauthorized migrants from Mexico and 73% of unau-
thorized migrants from Central America entered without inspection. PEw HIsp. CTR., MODES
OF ENTRY FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION 4 (2006), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/19.pdf. In contrast, 91% of all other unauthorized
migrants are visa overstays who escape penalties imposed for entering without inspection.
56. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)
(2006).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b (2008). Variations of
cancellation of removal also apply to persons already granted legal permanent resident sta-
tus, id. § 1229b(a)(1), and children and spouses who have been battered or subjected to ex-
treme cruelty by U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, id. § 1229b(b)(2).
60. Id. § 1229b.
61. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001).
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ration between parents and children left behind in the United States is un-
likely to rise to "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" because this
harm is not unusual and "[d]eportation rarely occurs without personal dis-
tress and emotional hurt.",62 Family separation is "simply one of the com-
mon results of deportation or exclusion [that] are insufficient to prove ex-
treme hardship." 63
Arguments that hardship will result from children accompanying de-
ported parents abroad are equally difficult. Diminished access to educa-
tion, health care, and economic opportunities for U.S. citizen children are
common results of deportation and thus do not meet the "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" standard.64 One circuit court of appeals de-
scribed the standard to qualify for relief as so high that it requires hardship
that is "uniquely extreme, at or closely approaching the outer limits of the
most severe hardship the alien could suffer and so severe that any reasona-
ble person would necessarily conclude that the hardship is extreme." 65 In-
deed, this "onerous standard is so difficult to satisfy that there is only one
published [Board of Immigration Appeals] decision that grants cancellation
of removal after finding that the requisite 'exceptional and extremely un-
usual hardship' existed.,
66
In two limited contexts, through the provision of non-immigrant T and U
visas to victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons, and persons suf-
fering substantial physical or mental abuse as victims of certain other
crimes,67 immigration law for the first time provides a means through
which a child's immigration status can flow from child to parent and from
child to siblings.68 These visas are significant for those who qualify, but
62. Sullivan v. INS, 772 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1985).
63. Jimenez v. INS, 116 F.3d 1485 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id.; In re Piggot, 15 I. & N. Dec. 129, 131 (BIA 1974) ("Congress has never ac-
cepted the theory that minor American-born children of deportable aliens must, or even
should, remain in the United States, and that living with their deportable parents in their
home country would result in 'extreme hardship' to them.").
65. Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1987).
66. Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzalez, 423 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting). The Board of Immigration Appeals is generally the final authority because
agency decisions regarding the existence of hardship are largely insulated from court re-
view. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2006); Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 891-
92 (9th Cir. 2003).
67. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(T)-(U)
(2006).
68. Provisions enacted as part of the Violence Against Women Act provide for a parent
to obtain status in some situations based on the abuse of a child by the other parent, but in
such instances the ultimate source of immigration status is the abusive parent. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 154(a)(1)(B)(ii)(bb). Though beyond the scope of this essay, it is worth noting that many
aspects of these visas present problems, such as the conflicting humanitarian and law en-
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they are available only in extreme situations, with eligibility triggered only
by intense suffering as a result of serious criminal activity.
In contrast to the narrative of children as anchoring parents in the United
States, the major avenues to lawful immigration status effectively and per-
vasively preclude children from generating immigration rights for their
parents. Concern that parents find easy and unwarranted pathways to U.S.
citizenship through their children is overstated. Furthermore, children as
immigrants themselves similarly face uphill battles. Yet myths that child-
ren generate immigration rights for parents under U.S. immigration law
stubbornly persist. What might U.S. immigration law look like if it actual-
ly treated children in the way that the commonly advanced myths presume
it does?
II. ENTERING THE MAINSTREAM
Perhaps one reason for the staying power of myths about children and
immigration is that the myths actually are much more in line with the gen-
eral treatment of children in law and society than are the realities of U.S.
immigration law. Indeed, the very ubiquity and persistence of the myths
prompt an examination of what immigration law might look like if it were
more consistent with these mainstream perceptions regarding children. The
discussion below does not attempt to comprehensively reform immigration
law, but rather imagines three simple reforms to U.S. immigration law that
would bring the law more in line with mainstream values regarding the
treatment of children in the law. Each of these also would bring the law
more in line with prevailing myths about the treatment of children in immi-
gration law. Indeed, there is irony in these suggestions in that the sug-
gested reforms would leave the law not only closer to mainstream values,
but also closer to the place where many seem to think it is already.
A. Expanding Notions of Family
In sharp contrast to the rigidity of immigration law, mainstream ap-
proaches to families and children largely leave families to make their own
critical decisions about who is considered family.69 Moreover, mainstream
treatment of families is more likely to acknowledge the importance of non-
traditional arrangements for caretaking and support of children. Immigra-
forcement objectives at play, the strange federalism concerns inherent in the role for local
and state law enforcement in a federal immigration scheme, and the expansion of visa eligi-
bility criteria centered on essential conceptions of persons as "victims."
69. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) ("[Tlhe Constitution
prevents [the government] from standardizing its children and its adults by forcing all to live
in certain narrowly defined family patterns.").
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tion law's exclusive use of a narrow construct of family effectively "ne-
gates other prevalent family configurations which make up functional fami-
lies, such as single-parent households, grandparent-grandchild households,
same-sex couples, polygamous marriages, and extended family configura-
tions."7 This approach ignores the fact that millions of children in the
United States "grow up in families in which care is not provided exclusive-
ly by two heterosexual opposite-sex parents. Instead, caregivers increa-
singly include gay and lesbian families, single parent or 'cohabiting' parent
families, families with grandparents (either as primary caregivers or in ad-
dition to primary caregivers), and various other formations."71
The failure to recognize non-traditional families in immigration law
creates disparate impacts across racial and ethnic lines. For example, fail-
ure to recognize grandparents who care for their grandchildren for immi-
gration purposes has a focused impact on Latino populations because "His-
panic grandparents are the largest population of noncitizen caregiver
grandparents., 72 Thus by clinging to a narrow and outdated construction of
family, immigration law advances "a false construct of human society, cul-
tural constructions, and racial and ethnic prejudices. 73
In the mainstream, without consideration of immigration law, families
routinely are built around children and their interests. Decisions about who
lives with whom often take into account who cares for or provides for
whom. Indeed, such interdependency and support are hallmarks of the no-
tion of family. Allowing immigration law to take into consideration impor-
tant relationships in children's lives would involve a conceptual shift in
immigration law, but not a major restructuring of the general framework
and institutions that immigration law employs. Simple changes to the sta-
tutory definition of "child" could ensure that every child could be recog-
nized as such for immigration law purposes.
In some instances the existing statutory definition of "child" already re-
quires adjudication of the bona fides of a parent-child relationship. It
would take little to adapt such scrutiny and analysis to evaluate the bona
fides of other relationships between children and the people who support
and care for them. Such a move away from the narrow nuclear family
would acknowledge and value the reality of children's lives, and in some
70. Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of
Family: Toward a Functional Definition of Family That Protects Children s Fundamental
Human Rights, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 509, 515 (2010).
71. Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care
Based Standard, 16 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 83, 91 (2004).
72. Zug, supra note 17, at 242.
73. King, supra note 70.
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instances, provide children and families with otherwise unavailable family-
sponsored immigration opportunities.
B. Removing Punishment for the Acts of Parents
The notion of penalizing children for the sins of their parents has long
been rejected as a mainstream approach to the treatment of children in law
and broader society. For example, it is generally accepted that the idea of
penalizing children for the circumstances of their birth out of wedlock is
"illogical and unjust."74  Imposing disabilities on children for such cir-
cumstances outside their control "is contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual re-
sponsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth
and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an un-
just-way of deterring the parent."75 Mainstream notions that recognize
children as autonomous individuals mandate rejection of the imposition of
legal disabilities upon children for actions taken by the adults in their
lives.7
6
Moreover, it is widely accepted that compared to adults, "juveniles have
a 'lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility'; they
'are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pres-
sures, including peer pressure'; and their characters are 'not as well
formed.' 77 Because "juveniles have lessened culpability they are less de-
serving of the most severe punishments." 78  Mainstream approaches to
children, therefore, do not expect adult levels of maturity from children and
do not assign legal consequences to juveniles as they do adults.
As noted above, however, U.S. immigration law imposes upon children
the same severe penalties and barriers that apply to adults who enter the
United States without inspection or remain without authorization. Even
where a child was too young to be capable of exercising independent
judgment and volition in entering the United States, such as infants carried
across the border, the legal consequences of unauthorized entry are im-
posed. This effectively negates the possibility that children's responsibility
74. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
75. Id.
76. See Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the "Legal Orphan ": Inheritance Rights of
Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 Mo. L. REv. 125, 150 (2005) (noting that
deterring adult activity by punishing children rather than the adults who engaged in that ac-
tivity is "grossly unfair").
77. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)).
78. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 551).
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is proportionate to any perceived culpability.79 In such instances, U.S. im-
migration law attaches the consequences of adult decisions and actions to
children who had no control over the actions for which they are now pu-
nished. As a deterrent to adult behavior, this approach has demonstrably
failed, evidenced by the large and constantly replenished population of
children among the wider population of unauthorized immigrants.8 °
The solution to this anomaly is quite straightforward: U.S. immigration
law statutes establishing grounds of inadmissibility or barring adjustment
of status based on unauthorized entry and presence without lawful status
can be modified to exclude reference to these actions while a minor. 81
Such amendments would not in and of themselves provide lawful immigra-
tion status to those who were brought to the United States without consent,
but they would remove barriers for those who otherwise qualify for path-
ways to lawful status via family or employment.
C. Children as Generators of Immigration Rights
Changing immigration law to recognize children as potential generators
of immigration rights for their parents would constitute a major shift in
immigration law. Of course, the political viability of any proposal to rec-
ognize children as generators of immigration rights is suspect, at best. But
this political judgment is an indicator of how far out of sync U.S. immigra-
tion law has become with other values related to the treatment of children.
Outside the realm of immigration law, the primacy of children's interests in
legal decisions regarding family is well established.8 2 Yet in immigration,
the last two decades have seen movement in the other direction. For exam-
ple, to avoid deportation through cancellation of the removal, "exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship" must be shown, which is a higher stan-
dard than the prior standard of "extreme hardship" to children. 83 U.S. im-
migration law has strayed so far from other areas of law in its treatment of
children, that we are left expecting from immigration law no more than the
mere avoidance of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to children.
Changes that would permit children and their interests to serve as gene-
rators of immigration rights in others would be significant reforms, but
would not be difficult or expensive to implement. As with the changes dis-
79. See Bhabha, supra note 37.
80. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
82. For example, "[t]he custody law in every state in the United States ... embraces the
'best interests' standard." D. Marianne Blair & Merle H. Weiner, Resolving Parental Custo-
dy Disputes-A Comparative Exploration, 39 FAM. L.Q. 247, 247 (2005).
83. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
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cussed above, fundamental reforms could be quickly accomplished within
the existing structures and mechanisms of immigration law. The provisions
and omissions that marginalize children in immigration law are subtle, yet
have major implications. Rolling back the limitations and barriers that de-
value children in immigration law can be accomplished with little more
than reversing these subtle omissions and barriers.
Most simply, changing the standard for cancellation of removal would
result in vastly different outcomes under currently existing procedures and
frameworks. Reverting to the pre-1996 standard of "extreme hardship" 84
would acknowledge that extreme hardship to children is an important and
relevant consideration in immigration law, even if such hardship is com-
monplace when parents face deportation. Yet shifting the standard only
from "exceptional and extremely unusual" back to "extreme hardship"
would hardly put immigration law in conformity with mainstream treat-
ment of children. There is much room between "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship" and the "best interests of the child," which is otherwise
the accepted standard when considering children.85 Indeed, a major step
toward a more child-centered immigration law would be accomplished by
allowing consideration of the hardship to children that is common when
families face separation due to deportation, rather than declaring it irrele-
vant simply because it is not extremely unusual. Any movement to further
recognize the important interests of children would inch immigration law
closer to the values the country espouses in the treatment of children in
other contexts.
More radical change, accomplished with simple changes in eligibility
language to ameliorate the omission of children from critical family-
sponsored and waiver provisions as discussed above,86 would allow exist-
ing family-sponsored immigration mechanisms to be adapted to permit
children to serve as the basis of family petitions. Children would not need
to actively serve as petitioners if provisions modeled on the Violence
Against Women Act's (VAWA) self-petitioning process were utilized.87
Pursuant to these provisions, a batterer's role as petitioner is bypassed and
victims are able to petition on their own behalf.88 As with parents of bat-
tered children under VAWA, parents under a revised eligibility statute
could take the lead in navigating through the application process. 89 Re-
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1995) (repealed).
85. See supra note 82.
86. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(l)(B)(ii)(bb) (2006).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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quirements related to public charge grounds of inadmissibility might be a
problem in some cases, but the provisions already in place to permit the in-
clusion of the income of household members would suffice in many in-
stances.
90
Allowing parents to obtain legal immigration status further advances the
goals and policies that generally advance and promote child welfare. Par-
ents with lawful immigration status are better able to integrate economical-
ly and socially for the benefit and support of the child and the family as a
whole.91 Providing immigration status to the family "enhances an individ-
ual's ability to integrate and thrive in the U.S. Immigrant families are vital
economic, psychological, and cultural resources that shelter and sustain
family members .... Stripping away this support would foster social isola-
tion and disconnection among immigrants rather than acculturation. ' '92
Empowering children to generate immigration rights in their parents per-
mits the legalization of families instead of just individual children. It will
also increase the family's integration and reduce the possible need for state
intervention or support for the child.
CONCLUSION
Giving life to the most basic notion that children's interests should have
relevance to U.S. immigration law should not sound like an overly ambi-
tious goal. Surely, the misalignment of U.S. immigration law with underly-
ing legal and societal values related to children and families has contributed
to the growth of the unauthorized population in the United States. And
surely this misalignment must be addressed for any immigration reform to
succeed. Any reform that looks back in deciding who may qualify without
looking at the law going forward will do nothing to address the asymmetry
of U.S. immigration law. Reforms that do not address the role of children
in immigration law will not prevent the societal and demographic pressures
from replicating the current situation in which millions find themselves un-
able to reconcile their family responsibilities with the dictates of immigra-
tion law.
U.S. law and policy in other contexts applaud the role that parents play
in supporting and nurturing their children. Children matter to parents. In-
deed, we expect that children matter to parents and we value actions by
parents that are in their children's interests. Moreover, we generally expect
90. See 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2 (2010).
91. See Immigr. Pol'y Ctr., Family Immigration: Repairing our Broken Immigration
System, AM. IMMIGR. CouNciL (2010), http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/
default/files/docs/FamilySolutions_0115 10.pdf.
92. Id.
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that children will matter across the spectrum of social and legal institutions.
The failure of U.S. immigration law to advance, or in most instances even
consider, the interests of children places it far out of the mainstream.
Children matter, and it is time they mattered in U.S. immigration law.
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